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ABSTRACT
Douglas Billy Michael. M.A., Department of Political Science, Wright
State University, 2018. “Explaining Nuclear Rollback: Examining the
Cessation of Nuclear Weaponization in Argentina and Brazil from 1964 –
1994.”
Seventy years after the first use of nuclear weapons in World War II, the
proliferation of these apocalyptic munitions remains a key policy issue on the
international stage. The available literature on nuclear proliferation suggests a
strong correlation between the threat of rival a state seeking nuclear weapons
and a state’s own decision to pursue its own nuclear weapons. Regional rivals
Argentina and Brazil both initiated nuclear weapons programs and were also
developing nuclear delivery systems; however, these countries were able to step
out of this dyadic proliferation spiral and renounced their nuclear weapons
programs. Often assumed a success of the burgeoning nonproliferation regime
embodied by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, some scholars view
Argentina and Brazil as boldly resistant to the aggressive posture of the extraregional regime.
Which International Relations (IR) theory is best suited to explain the
proliferation outcomes of Argentina and Brazil? More specifically, were
Argentina and Brazil’s nuclear proliferation decisions driven more by security,
norms, or domestic politics? A case study of this dyad will be done using process
tracing to determine which theory best supports the nuclear re-posturing of each
country.
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I.
INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem
Since the advent of Nuclear Weapons technology during WWII, some states
have chosen to acquire nuclear weapons, a subset of these states have eventually
abandoned the pursuit, while other states have never chosen to initiate the quest.1 The
overriding motivations for states to acquire nuclear weapons include national security,
a ticket to major power status, domestic pride, and genuine technological curiosity,
and while nuclear weapons have perhaps not spread as quickly as some early
predictions warned, current efforts to provide absolute proliferation control are
proving unsuccessful (North Korea, India, Pakistan2, and perhaps Iran). The nondevelopment of nuclear weapons since their inception cannot be explained only by
material rationalism. Moreover, Realist scholars have repeatedly argued that when one
state in an adversarial or competitive dyad initiates the pursuit of nuclear weapons, the
other dyadic state is compelled to do the same or risk loss of power relative to the
initiating state. How then, can rival states overcome this threat and step out of this
cycle once the process has begun?

William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatshanova, “Divining Nuclear Intentions: A Review Essay”
International Security, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Summer 2008), pp. 139-169
2
After withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), North Korea publicly announced its
intention, and subsequently tested a nuclear device in 2006. India and Pakistan have both developed
nuclear weapons and have remained outside of the NPT.
1
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Trends in Nuclear Proliferation
Nine states are commonly held to have nuclear weapons; however, more could
acquire them with relative ease. Five of these states are officially recognized as
possessing nuclear weapons by the 1968 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): The
United States, Russia, The United Kingdom, France and China;3 four additional states
are known, or generally considered to possess nuclear weapons: Israel, India, Pakistan,
and North Korea. For states believed to be in pursuit of nuclear weapons, their citizens
often bear the burden on those efforts in taxes, sanctions, and sacrificed opportunities
for economic and educational development. However, the leaders of those pursuant
states might approach the nuclear calculus from a different perspective. Nuclear
weapons are said to provide their possessor with a deterrent capability, which
Schelling has defined as “persuading an enemy that, when he takes our response into
account, he should prefer to behave in ways we prefer him to behave.”4 Many Realists
have based proliferation examinations on the premise that the possession of nuclear
weapons is the natural evolution of a state’s desire for security and balance in an
anarchic system.5 Waltz has argued that nuclear weapons offer security through

3

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), signed in 1968, is the most widely
adhered-to international security agreement. The “three pillars” of the NPT are nuclear disarmament,
nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Article VI of the NPT commits states possessing
nuclear weapons to negotiate in good faith toward halting the arms race and the complete elimination
of nuclear weapons. The Treaty stipulates that non-nuclear-weapon states will not seek to acquire
nuclear weapons and will accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on their nuclear
activities, while nuclear weapon states commit not to transfer nuclear weapons to other states. All
states have a right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and should assist one another in its
development. The NPT provides for conferences of member states to review treaty implementation at
five-year intervals. Initially of a 25-year duration, the NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995.
4
Thomas C. Schelling, “The Future of Arms Control” Operations Research, Vol. 9, No. 5 (SeptemberOctober, 1961), p. 726
5
John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War” International
Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer, 1990), pp. 5-56;
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deterrence at a significantly reduced cost over the continual modernization of a
conventional military force. He claims that this cost reduction allows resources, which
would have otherwise been directed to security concerns, to be redirected toward other
state interests, such as strengthening the economy.6 The stabilizing power of nuclear
weapons has lead realists to project a world full of nuclear weapons that, at least in
some regard, has yet come to pass. Nevertheless, the sheer destructive power of
nuclear weapons has created global concern over both horizontal proliferations, the
number of countries (or actors) that have nuclear weapons, and vertical proliferation,
the number of nuclear warheads each state possesses.7 The result has been states that
possess nuclear weapons do not want non-nuclear states to pursue the capability, nor
do non-nuclear states want nuclear states to grow their arsenals. This research focuses
on the issue of horizontal proliferation.
Realism and neo-realism have made great strides in explaining the role of
external security threats as a primary driver of proliferation,8 but a great deal of this
analysis has focused only on states that have developed nuclear capabilities. The
discipline has failed to give proper attention to states that have either abandoned, or
never initiated the development of nuclear weapons. Cases with variance to the

Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics” International Security, Vol.
18, No. 2 (Autumn 1993), pp. 44-79; Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz’s The Spread of Nuclear
Weapons: A Debate (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995)
7
Richard K. Betts, “Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs and Nonproliferation” Foreign Policy, Vol. 26, No. 4
(Spring 1977) pp. 157–183.
8
Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics” International Security, Vol.
18, No. 2 (Autumn 1993), pp. 44-79; Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz’s The Spread of Nuclear
Weapons : A Debate (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995); John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future:
Instability in Europe after the Cold War” International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer, 1990), pp. 556; Daniel Deudney, "Dividing Realism: Structural Realism and Security Materialism on Nuclear
Security and Proliferation." Security Studies Volume 2 (Summer 1993), 7-36.
6
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dependent variable will identify the antecedent conditions required for the successful
operation of prevailing proliferation theories.
Why has the nonproliferation regime failed to thwart nuclear weapons
proliferation in some states? Are the claimed nonproliferation successes of the regime
valid? Realists have provided a plausible game-theoretic framework through which we
may evaluate dyadic proliferation episodes yet the anomalous cases of abandoned
proliferation are often under analyzed. Waltz9 has demonstrated a strong correlation
between interstate rivalry and the fulfillment of a nuclear arms race, however, not all
states that have breached the economic and technological thresholds have chosen to
produce nuclear weapons. Moreover, some rival states have mastered nuclear
technology and been to the brink of weaponization, only to step back down.

The Research Question
Why have rival states with an adequate economic and technological nuclear
threshold as well as a demonstrated desire to attain nuclear weapons mutually
abandoned their nuclear pursuits? Which International Relations (IR) theory is best
suited to explain the proliferation outcomes of Argentina and Brazil? More
specifically, were Argentina and Brazil’s nuclear proliferation decisions driven more
by security, norms, or domestic politics??

Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better” Adelphi Papers No 171
(1981) and Kenneth N. Waltz, "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities," American Political Science
Review Vol 84, No. 3 (Fall 1990) pp. 731-745.
9
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Sub-questions
1.

Can proliferation be avoided once a state has decided to initiate a

nuclear weapons development program?
2.

How can the nonproliferation regime effectively deter states who

have initiated nuclear weapons programs?
3.

Is nuclear non-proliferation a successful stabilizing agent for regional

adversaries?
The above research questions will be examined in one case of dyadic
proliferation: Argentina and Brazil. This study chose Argentina and Brazil to
determine which international relations theory best supports the eventual nuclear reposturing of each country. While most of the literature on case selection has
emphasized the demand for unbiased, random selection, a clear exception has been
required for research aimed at identifying the conditions required for theories to
operate successfully. Steven van Evera has suggested that using Mill’s method of
difference10, selecting new cases similar to previously tested cases in every way accept
the value on the dependent variable, is an appropriate methodology for inferring
antecedent conditions.11 Geddes echoes this claim in that when required, case selection
based on the dependent variables can “bring to light anomalies that current theories
cannot accommodate.”12 Brazil and Argentina meet the criteria for case selection in
that during the time the nuclear policies were being established, the states were rivals

10

John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2002)
Steven van Evera Guide to Methods for Student of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1997) p. 71
12
Barbara Geddes, “How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in
Comparative Politics.” Political Analysis 2 (1990), pp.131-150
11
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in terms of regional influence and military power, which was further complicated by
Argentina’s disputes with Great Britain over control of the Falkland Islands. The
regional rivalry between Argentina and Brazil also follows Waltz’s prediction that
“new nuclear states may come in hostile pairs and share a common boarder,” 13 as was
the case with India and Pakistan.

Methodology
For the purpose of this study, I assume that Argentine and Brazilian nuclear
policies were shaped primarily by either security concerns, adherence to international
norms, or domestic political pressure. For the years covered in this study (1964 –
1994) regional rivalry drove security concerns, the international community gave birth
to the non-proliferation regime, and democratic transitions in both states began to
consolidate.
For the purpose of this study, I define nuclear proliferation as the possession of
a weaponized nuclear agent as demonstrated through the testing of such a device,
and/or as recognized by international consensus.14 The case study method is
appropriate for this research because it permits an in-depth study of Argentine and
Brazilian nuclear proliferation decisions which allows for utilization of process-tracing
to explore possible intervening variables which may affect any correlation between
independent and dependent variables. Case studies, such as those in this study, are

13

Kenneth N. Waltz (and Scott D. Sagan) The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: W.
W. Norton, 1995) p. 11
14
Israel, while never having officially declared itself as such, is an example of the latter.
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appropriate venues for process tracing interacting variables which are not independent
of each other.15 The independent variable will be the extent to which leading
proliferation theories impact proliferation decisions. The dependent variables in this
case will be the resulting non-proliferation of Argentina and Brazil. This study will
cover the time period from 1964 to 1994. 1964 was chosen because it is the first
indication that the Brazilian Military was interested in pursuing a weapons grade
nuclear capability.16 The study ends in 1994 upon both parties signing the Treaty of
Tlatelolco, which created a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the
Caribbean.17
I hypothesize that one of these three lenses, security, norms, or domestic
politics best explains the resulting non-proliferation of this rivalrous dyad. Content
analysis of the evidence will allow for process tracing, providing insight into how
restrictive variables, or combinations thereof, evolved over the course of the states’
proliferation episode, or more appropriately, non-proliferation episode.
To move beyond the realists’ emphasis on external security threats, I will
examine the proliferation decisions of Argentina and Brazil to uncover the conditions
required for each state to abandon their nuclear pursuits and overcome the external
security threat and abandon the potential regional arms race. Realists’ game theoretic

15

George, Alexander and Bennett, Andrew. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social
Sciences. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005) p 212.
16
"Airgram from the Embassy of the US in Rio De Janeiro to the Department of State, 'Non-Peaceful
Uses of Atomic Energy by Brazil'," March 28, 1964, History and Public Policy Program Digital
Archive, RG 59, Subject-Numeric Files, 1964-1966. Box 948, FSE 13 Brazil
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/145010
17
On January 18, 1994, Argentina and Chile, and on May 30, 1994, Brazil, brought into force the 1967
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco Treaty) for their national
territories. https://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/treaties/treaty-prohibition-nuclear-weaponslatin-america-tlatelolco-treaty
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treatment would suggest that once initiated, Brazil and Argentina would not have been
able to pull themselves out of the dyadic proliferation spiral. While realists pose that
“Man’s capability for self-destruction cannot be eradicated,” this study will provide a
better understanding of what Thomas Schelling further claimed were the necessary
“incentives that minimize recourse to violence.”18 I asses an overemphasis on realists’
security drivers has caused the debate on nuclear proliferation to remain
underdeveloped despite exhaustive efforts at its resolution. By analyzing the paradigm
that framed the proliferation decisions of states that abandoned nuclear weapons
pursuits, the literature can move beyond failed predictions of the past.
Non-proliferation for realists is generally assumed the result of extended
deterrence, where the weaker non-proliferating state would seek to align itself with a
nuclear ally. If security drivers shaped proliferation decisions, the evidence would be
ripe with references to the international security environment, threats from nuclear
weapons states, threats from the opposite dyadic player, a change in the external threat
environment, or efforts to secure defense agreements that could provide a nuclear
umbrella from an ally.19 If the existing or emerging norms shaped these decisions, the
evidence should indicate sensitivity to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and
resulting international nonproliferation regime, behavioral norms against the use and
subsequent development of nuclear weapons, and an overriding respect for

Thomas C. Schelling, “The Future of Arms Control” Operations Research, Vol. 9, No. 5
(September-October, 1961), p. 731
19
Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better” Adelphi Papers No 171
(1981) and Kenneth N. Waltz, "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities," American Political Science
Review Vol 84, No. 3 (Fall 1990) pp. 731-745; Steven Van Evera, “Primed for Peace: Europe After the
Cold War” International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (1990/1991) pp. 7-57; and John J. Mearsheimer,
“Here We Go Again.” The New York Times, May 17, 1998
18
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international partners and international law.20 If domestic politics was the primary
driver, the evidence should indicate a sensitivity to the political and economic costs of
a weapons program, democratic consolidation, or perhaps a change in threat
perception at the individual level of the state’s leadership.21

Presence of/Concern for

Theoretical Explanations of Argentine and Brazilian Nuclear Rapprochement
Security
Norms
Domestic Politics
International security
environment

Adherence/acceptance
of NNPT

Economic cost/benefit

Under nuclear threat

Behavioral norms

Political cost/benefit

Under rival threat

Nuclear non-use

Threat Environment shift

Respect for international
partners/law

Nuclear Umbrella

Fear of opposition/loss
of prestige

Democratic
consolidation
Domestic organizations
(Nuclear Energy,
Military, Trade)
Domestic players
(Politicians, Public)

Table 1. Research Design

I will test each case for the way manner in which each of the aforementioned
theoretical independent variables were perceived by the policy makers through an
archival review of literature related to the proliferation policies of each state. The
available literature consists of treaties, agreements, speeches, statements, and other

20

Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Nina Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of
the Nuclear Taboo” International Security Vol. 29, No. 3 (2005) pp. 5-49; Peter van Ham Nuclear
Managing Non-Proliferation Regimes in the 1990s: Power, Politics, and Policies (New York: Royal
Institute of International Affairs, 1994) p. 73; and Jacques E. C. Hymans, 2006. The Psychology of
Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2006)
21
Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons: Three Models in Search of a Bomb”
International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (1996/1997) pp. 54-86; and Etel Solingen, “The Political
Economy of Nuclear Restraint.” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (1994) pp. 126-169.
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available documents of both public and private origins. As Van Evera has also
identified the need for data richness with regard to case selection,22 Argentina and
Brazil are valuable candidates. The availability of evidence is likely to be greater for
Argentina and Brazil given that documents, both public and private, are more readily
accessible in democracies than in authoritative regimes.23 Examples of relevant
documentation include the Treaty of Tlatelolco, whereby on 14 February 1967,
Mexico opened a treaty that would be signed by twenty six Latin American states, as
well as the Agreement between the Republic of Argentina and the Federative Republic
of Brazil for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy.
No matter what ontological or epistemological grounds with which we
approach the study proliferation, Thomas Schelling reminds us that “just as the
absence of war today does not make war impossible tomorrow, total disarmament
would not make rearmament impossible the next day.”24 While this study will help to
identify possible antecedent conditions of perception that led to nonproliferation in the
cases of Argentina and Brazil, further testing of these conditions would be required to
establish their generalizability. Hymans argues “the way forward for the proliferation
literature is to further develop theory and to rigorously test any new theoretical
developments through in-depth process-tracing analysis of an ever more complete

22

Steven van Evera Guide to Methods for Student of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1997) p. 79; Barbara Geddes, “How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get:
Selection Bias in Comparative Politics.” Political Analysis 2 (1990), pp.131
23
The availability of information in democracies has been emphasized in the following: Liz Harrop,
“Propaganda’s War on Human Rights” Peace Review, Vol. 16, Issue 3 (Fall 2004), pp. 311-316; Mira
T. Sundara Rajan, “The Past and Future of Privacy in Russia” Review of Central and East European
Law, Vol. 27 Issue 4 (2002) pp.625-638
24
Thomas C. Schelling, “The Future of Arms Control” Operations Research, Vol. 9, No. 5
(September-October, 1961), p. 722
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historical record.”25 This study is however a necessary step in attempting to overcome
the gap left in the discipline by the predominant theories of proliferation behavior.

Jacques E.C. Hymans, “Nuclear Proliferation and Non-Proliferation” The International Studies
Encyclopedia. (London: Blackwell, 2010), p 5463.
25

11

II.
LITERATURE REVIEW

Since the first use of nuclear weapons in 1945, scholars and statesmen alike
have revered nuclear weapons as the ultimate deterrence to acts of war or aggression
against the possessing state. Because some states pursued the bomb, some states have
not, and all desire policies to influence others’ proliferation decisions, much of the
nuclear proliferation literature has focused on predicting likely proliferators. However,
once a proliferation episode has been initiated, what options are available to deter
those states’ desires and end the chase? Views on who chooses to develop these
weapons as well as their motivations, incentives and inducements are generally
divided into those that focus on security drivers, international norms, or domestic
politics.

Security
The uncertainty of nuclear weapons development is cloaked in the uncertainty
of dual-use: the star-like power created in nuclear science can be used just as easily
used to provide peaceful civilian energy as it can to provide the most destructive force
known to mankind. When a state begins pursuit of a nuclear capability, the ground is
ripe for miscalculation and often, proliferation begets proliferation. To predict
proliferation outcomes, a nuanced game theoretic treatment of the problem of nuclear
proliferation provides a structure to examine the policies and institutions that may also
be shaping proliferation decisions. Most proliferation episodes are theorized to emerge
12

from the basic structure of the Prisoners' Dilemma (PD): how can self-interested
competitive actors cooperate when faced with the stakes of a nuclear magnitude? In a
dyadic proliferation episode, each actor, or state has two choices, develop a nuclear
weapon, or nonproliferation. Taken together, the dyad can produce four possible
outcomes which are preferred in the following order: first, the state develops the bomb
while the other adheres to nonproliferation (PN); second, both state choose
nonproliferation (NN); third, both develop nuclear weapons (PP); finally, the least
favorable outcome would be for the state adhere to nonproliferation while the other
acquire the bomb (NP), as the cost of nuclear retribution would be too high to
absorb.26
In an anarchic world, Waltz establishes the theory of rational deterrence with
regard to nuclear proliferation decisions, whereby states seek to secure their survival
in a zero-sum game by increasing their power through the acquisition of nuclear
weapons, or by forging an alliance with those already in possession. 27 As nuclear
proliferation cycle begins to unfold, states respond to the changing international
security environment and perceived threats from adversarial states, who are either
developing or in possession of their own nuclear weapons, by pursuing the bomb
themselves. The Soviet Union acquired nukes to balance against the U.S.; Britain and
France acquired them to deter the Soviet Union; China developed to deter the U.S. and
the Soviets; India followed China; Pakistan followed India. For Waltz, the threat of

Robert Jervis, “Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation” World Politics, Vol. 40, No. 3 (April
1988) pp.317-349.
27
Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better” Adelphi Papers No 171
(1981) and Kenneth N. Waltz, "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities," American Political Science
Review Vol 84, No. 3 (Fall 1990) pp. 731-745.
26
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development from the opposite -dyadic player should be enough to spur nuclear
weapons development. Non-proliferation for realists is generally assumed the result of
extended deterrence, where the weaker non-proliferating state would seek to align
itself with a nuclear ally; those incapable of accomplishing the technical feat pursue an
alliance with a nuclear state that could extend its “nuclear umbrella.” Furthermore, for
the realist, the spread of nuclear weapons is not necessarily to be avoided as nuclear
weapons provide a powerful deterrent effect and serve as a stabilizing agent on the
international stage. 28, Mearsheimer argues that despite attempts to curtain and rollback
proliferation, more states will inevitably develop the bomb.29
T.V. Paul divides proliferation efforts into two camps: great-powers, and nongreat-powers, where the proliferation policies of the latter are “determined largely by
the level and type of security threats that it faces and the nature of interactions or
conflict with its key adversaries and allies in its immediate geo-strategic environment.
However, the nuclear choices of great powers (Britain, China, France, Russia, and the
United States) are determined chiefly by larger powers’ relations in the international
system.”30 In failing to clearly define how he judges the status of great powers, Paul
demonstrates the bias of his “Prudential Realism” and one that appears frequently
throughout the realists’ attempts to explain nonproliferation. Paul implies by the
examples given that he considers the possession of nuclear weapons to be a precursor
to “great power” status. Waltz applies this restriction in his refusal to acknowledge

Steven Van Evera, “Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War” International Security, Vol. 15,
No. 3 (1990/1991) pp. 7-57
29
John J. Mearsheimer, “Here We Go Again.” The New York Times, May 17, 1998
30
T.V. Paul Power versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons (Montreal: McGillQueens University Press, 2000) p. 4-5
28
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Germany or Japan as great powers in international politics.31 The division of great
power relations and non-great-power relations based on military strength ignores that
when ranked on an economic basis there are still members of both great powers and
non-great-powers that are not following uniform proliferation policy predictions.
Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States have chosen to develop nuclear
weapons; however, Germany and Japan have each chosen against proliferation, yet
each remains a great economic power. Furthermore, Great Britain relies on the United
States for its nuclear arsenal and the same can be said of the patterns, or lack thereof,
with respect to non-great-powers. While I do agree with the importance of
understanding the context and situations in which proliferation decisions are made, I
do not agree with the dichotomy as established by Paul. The literature unanimously
points to nuclear weapons possession as an immediate vehicle to great power status.
However, costly nuclear arms races are often the byproduct for those that embrace the
bomb and anyone standing as a rival. Proliferation decisions, by all powers great or
small, will best be understood when considering how a state perceives its interactions
with its key adversaries and allies in its immediate geo-strategic environment as well
as its relations in the international system. Again, I believe this is where the
weaponization norm has skewed the methodology.
Many scholars argue that realism too often overemphasizes the external
security drivers and ignores the domestic and international policies that shape states’
proliferation policies. Realism predicts a world full of nuclear weapons possessors;
however, most states have yet to develop a nuclear weapons program and many
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remain unaligned with those that do wield the capability.

Norms
With the emergence of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968, an
international norm against the development of nuclear weapons began to emerge.
International dialogue began to shift from the stabilizing effects of nuclear weapons to
a focus on the human cost of nuclear miscalculation. Initially proposed by Ireland and
Finland, the treaty focuses on non-proliferation, disarmament, and the right to peaceful
use of nuclear technology.
Doyle argues the built-it institutional checks and balances, adherence to the
rule of law, and an inherent drive to the peaceful resolution of disputes creates a
“democratic peace” by which democratic dyads are less likely to engage in conflict.
When extended to nuclear weapons decisions, the same variables should be present.32
Keohane argues that actors can also set aside their perceived immediate good,
to achieve a higher corporate good; individual state actors may value certain
international institutions enough to cooperate with their nonbinding mandates, even if
they may prefer not to. A concern of retribution, retaliation, or expulsion from the
whole is the driving force behind most international institution, in general, and the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and resulting international nonproliferation regime
more specifically. 33 Sagan argues that the NPT not only provides a sense of inclusion,
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but it is also serves to increase states' confidence about the limits of their potential
adversaries' nuclear programs and can empower domestic actors who are opposed to
nuclear weapons development. 34
Tannenwald challenges the actual value of even developing nuclear weapons
by examining the Nuclear Taboo and the normative basis of non-use that has emerged
over the past 6 decades of this class of weapon. Tannenwald argues that in the decades
following the only use of nuclear weapons in World War II, a behavioral norm has
emerged against these apocalyptic tools, which serves to delegitimize them as viable
option of war. 35 While Tannenwald’s argument is centered on the use of nuclear
weapons, those adhering to these norms would most likely eschew even crossing the
threshold of development out of respect for international partners, law, fear of
opposition, or loss of prestige.
Moving beyond classical constructivism, Hymans approaches the question of
nuclear proliferation from a political psychology perspective, arguing that the national
identity conceptions (NICs) of individual leaders at critical times in the evolution of
nuclear thought has driven the proliferation decisions of most states. Hymans offers
four lenses through which to examine the states executive decision-maker’s identity:
oppositional, or "us versus them"; sportsmanlike, "if both we and they are perceived to
be nested within wider, single 'transcendent' identity groupings" (p. 22); nationalist, a
feeling of equality or superiority; and subaltern, or subordinate. Hymans argues that
proliferation will occur when the deciding leader is both oppositional and nationalist,
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moreover when a leader perceives external hostility coupled with a strong sense of
equality or superiority.36 However, little attention is given to a stabilizing control to
account for the constant turnover in leadership within democratic states; as new NICs
take command, states nuclear policies would seemingly swing wildly and would likely
eventually trend toward proliferation.

Domestic Politics
The domestic politics model opens up the automated state decision-making
responses of realism by emphasizing domestic players with an interest in the outcomes
of those decisions. A state’s nuclear energy sector, the military, politicians, and the
public are likely to have interests and opinions on the proliferation policies of the
state. Nuclear weapons are political tools with economic costs and risks often used to
advance domestic and bureaucratic interests.
Organization theory suggests certain bureaucracies may generate environments
that favor pro-proliferation preferences by exaggerating perceptions of national
threats, supporting sympathetic politicians, and lobbying for increased defense
spending. The result would be increased financing and prestige for scientists and state
laboratories. Solingen further builds upon these institutional determinates by arguing
that the economic factors often trump any other variables in the proliferation decisions
of democratic actors. Democratic states interested in proliferation but pursing liberal
economic policies may determine that the potential damage done to international
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economic alliances could outweigh the benefits realized from pursuing
weaponization.37
Peter van Ham dichotomizes causal proliferation variables into two broad
categories: those of demand and those of supply. “On the demand side… (1) acute
threat perceptions; (2) general national security concerns; and (3) political prestige. On
the supply side, the issue of the availability of sensitive materials, technology,
equipment, and know-how is of crucial importance.”38 Brazil and Argentina again
prove compliant with these variables, but as a nuclear pursuing dyad offer needed
variance to the resulting nuclear nonproliferation.
In 2004, Singh and Way published a quantitative test of the determinants of
nuclear proliferation, and found that while the realists’ security argument proved to
have a great deal of theoretical validity, there was also emphasis given to the
restrictive powers of economic interdependence and liberalization variables as well.39
Singh and Way acknowledge that while their qualitative test has given weight to the
persistence of certain variables in relation to proliferation, there is still a need to
examine the effects caused by interaction between the causal variables. These
conditional effects are what I seek to identify in the cases of Brazil and Argentina.
With regards to Brazil and Argentina, Singh and Way held that both countries
had achieved the first two “degrees of nuclearness” by demonstrating an interest in
nuclear weapons and undertaking substantial efforts to develop nuclear weapons. The
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authors’ model accurately suggested that both states were likely candidates for
proliferation; however, both eventually abandoned their pursuits before acquiring a
working device. Traditional proliferation theory, heavily entrenched in game theory,
suggests that because each state had undertaken a significant commitment towards
developing a nuclear weapon, each would react by committing even more solemnly to
attaining a nuclear weapon. The failures to reach the final “degree of nuclearness”
make this dyad an outlier.
The proliferation debate has been driven by the concern over who ultimately
possess nuclear weapons and has largely ignored states that do not. Brazil and
Argentina remind us that the possession of dual use nuclear technology does not
equate the intent to weaponize the material. The rising demand for nuclear energy
requires the acceptance of such technologies.40 Once again, Germany, Japan, Brazil,
Argentina, and Australia are examples of these self-restricted regimes. I will test the
Brazilian and Argentinean cases to identify how the presence of determinants that
initiated these states nuclear pursuits’ and indicated eventual acquisition of a nuclear
weapon was likely, failed to produce nuclear weapons. It is precisely the presence of
the compounding security threat for Brazil and Argentina as previously tested by
Singh and Way that makes these two states ideal candidates for this study. For the
purpose of this study, I will define nuclear proliferation as the possession of a
weaponized nuclear agent as demonstrated through the testing of such a device, and/or
as recognized by international consensus.41
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Tanya Ogilvie-White argues that the epistemological debate over proliferation
study has led to more skepticism and underdeveloped results than to reliable policy
prescriptions. In reviewing the approaches that have been used to address the issue of
proliferation, Ogilvie-White finds that there are contributions and limitations from
each. While classical realism has been able to explain the importance of security
considerations, it has ignored domestic determinants and has made inaccurate
predictions about proliferation behavior. Neo-realism has also produced elegant,
logically deduced explanations of nuclear proliferation, but has side-stepped the
empirical difficulties. By ignoring the outliers, it has failed to explain unit level
outcomes because it has focused on systemic outcomes, therefore its predictions and
explanations are misleading and inaccurate. Neo-liberal institutionalism has explained
certain domestic economic and political determinants but left the decision-making
process out of the analysis. In terms of the structure side of the agent versus structure
debate, organizational theory has defended the role of organizations in irrational
behavior and also has focused analysis on the implementation of decisions. However,
it has also underestimated the impact that individual beliefs can have in changing the
structure. This has led the agent side of the debate to employ belief systems theory to
focus on the role of individuals and groups to explain seemingly “irrational,” rational
decisions. However, Ogilvie-White reminds us that it is difficult to quantify these
values and has still failed to explain causal mechanisms of beliefs. Analysis of
learning models have alleviated some of this burden and have helped to explain of
new information can impact individuals and lead to structural change. Unfortunately,
it too has lost its predictive power by lacking the ability to explain what lessons are
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likely to be learned under what circumstances. And finally, the social construction of
technology (SCOT) theory has tried to explain the role of technology by placing
nuclear proliferation in historical and social contexts, but in doing so has becomes so
descriptive that the variables required to test such a theory have become
unmanageable.42 If nothing else, Ogilvie-White at least identifies the complexity with
which one is confronted when approaching the issue of proliferation and in doing so
has created a compelling case for pluralism. While a complete evaluation of
proliferation through each of the aforementioned ontological foundations would be
well beyond the scope of this project, I will test the Brazilian and Argentinean cases to
identify which of the leading IR theories is best suited to explain the proliferation
outcomes of Argentina and Brazil.
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III.
ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL

Security, Prestige, and Politics
Argentina and Brazil are the most nuclear advanced countries in all of Latin
America, with nuclear programs dating as far back as the 1950s. This chapter presents
a correlation between the shift to nuclear weaponization between the two states,
measured by the degree to which each states’ policies were being driven by the fear of
uncertainty over the opposing state’s policies, a desire to adhere to emerging
international norms, or simply a factor of domestic politics. An archival review of
each states nuclear development effort follows.

Argentina: Nuclear Origins
By the late 1940s, Argentina was the most economically and politically
powerful country in South America43 and the pursuit of nuclear energy fit well with
Argentine President Juan D. Peron’s (1946–1955) desire for regional leadership and
prestige.44 Austrian physicist Ronald Richter fed Peron’s interest by convincing him
that Argentina could achieve that state of the art in nuclear advances for less than the
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investments made by the U.S. and the USSR45. Peron subsequently appointed Richter
as the director of a research facility on Huemul Island and in 1951, Peron announced
that Richter had produced a controlled thermonuclear fusion reaction. However,
several leading nuclear physicists disputed the claim, eventually exposing Richter’s
fraud claim and the Huemul nuclear research facility was dismantled.46
Despite the setback and international embarrassment, Argentina‘s nuclear
program was to be undeterred.47 The National Commission for Atomic Energy
(CNEA), established on 31 May 1950 by President Peron to plan and organize
national policies and guidelines for scientific and technological development,
specifically nuclear advancements.48 CNEA initial undertaking was to build technical
and managerial teams separate from the Argentine government, a nonpartisan
organization with stability and autonomy.49 CNEA centralized Argentina’s nuclear
development efforts and between 1950 and 1983, the leadership of CNEA was held by
the military. However, the military’s grip and influence over Argentine nuclear
policies began to loosen with the return of democratic rule to Argentina in 1983 and
the transition to civilian control of CNEA.50
Argentina and Brazil launched their nuclear programs in the mid-1950s, soon
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after U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” effort. The U.S.
effort attempted to limit the spread of nuclear weapons by providing civil nuclear
energy know-how to be used for peaceful purposes only. Initially, the U.S. provided
technical information, training, and subsidies to promote nuclear development in
Argentina and Brazil.51 Through this program, Argentina was able to train 200
scientists and had built by 1958.52 Brazil too, was able to purchase several research
reactors – its first one obtained in 1971.53
Waisman argues the declining standard of living, human rights violations of
the military, and the defeat of the Argentine military in the Malvinas-Falklands War
led to an outcry for the end of the military regime in Argentina.54 The violence and
poorly executed foreign campaigning of the preceding military regime caused it to
have decreased currency as a political ally. 55 For Argentina, this helped to limit posttransitional power of the military. Dahl has argued that military and police
organizations being subject to civilian control are a necessary condition of democracy.
56

Linz, Stepan, and Aguero argue that because an attempted coup in 1990,
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democratic regime further legitimized civilian control and helped to galvanize many in
favor of democracy. 57 Levitsky and Murillo have argued that the Argentine financial
crisis of 2001-2002 was significant test for the military. Even in an atmosphere of
chaos, the military accepted its exclusion from regime change. 58 Aguero examines
the role of civilian and military relations which resulted from the amnesty provisions
for human rights violations performed by the military regime. He finds that tensions
were eventually calmed when the amnesty provisions were vetoed and the officers
were tried. 59 Waisman also suggests that the economic stagnation of the 1980’s in
Argentina also led to the “formation of a democratic political culture, the commitment
to democracy of economic and political elites, and strong political leadership.”

60

Three key factors have motivated Argentina’s nuclear development efforts
over time, despite the countries revolving leadership: national pride and prestige, selfsufficiency, and national security. When the Argentine nuclear program began to
achieve success, it was embraced as a source of pride;61 the nuclear program held
broad societal support with little opposition.62 Concern over foreign-supplied energy
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dependencies also fostered a significant nuclear component in Argentina‘s economic
development strategy.63 Furthermore, Argentina had abundant uranium reserves so
nuclear development was seen as a way to utilize the countries natural resources to
develop.64 The highly technical skills required to undergird the nuclear infrastructure
was also viewed as an advantageous boon to all other sectors of the county’s
economy.65
On the national security front, Argentina had limited disputes with its
neighbors and was not formally engaged in international military disputes, apart from
the dispute with the UK over the Falklands Islands and a territorial disagreement with
Chile over Patagonia.66 The invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina, on April
2nd, 1982 was viewed as a direct assault on British serenity, a nuclear-weapon state.
Argentina had claimed sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, approximately 300 miles
east since the early 19th century; however, Britain had held the islands since 1833 and
rejected Argentina’s claims. The UK initially committed a task force of 28,000 troops
and over 100 ships, while Argentina had approximately 12,000 conscripted soldiers on
the Falklands with about 40 ships. The first major conflict occurred on May 2nd, 1982
with the sinking of the Argentine cruiser, General Belgrano. Subsequently, the British
destroyer, HMS Sheffield, was hit and sunk by an Exocet missile. The 74-day war,
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while muted by some standards, still cost a total of 655 Argentine and 255 British
lives. 67
Brazil’s population size, rapid modernization, U.S. alliance, and nuclear
program evoked concern in Argentine political and military circles. Despite any
ongoing debates regarding the economic benefits to the development of nuclear
power, the emergence of the Brazilian nuclear program provided enough instability
and rationale for Argentina to pursue its own nuclear program, despite the fact that the
last armed conflict between the two countries had occurred over 100 years prior.68
Heeding a core tenant of realism, the emergence of the Brazilian nuclear program
coupled with the regional Argentina-Brazil rivalry provided the spark for the
Argentines to want to pursue a nuclear program.

Brazil: Nuclear Origins
Brazilian scientists had begun studying and experimenting with nuclear fission
by the 1930s; however, it wasn’t until Peron’s Huemul Island claims surfaced in 1951
that Brazil’s nuclear overtures began to coalesce. In response to Argentina’s
establishment of CENA, Brazil established the Conselho Nacional de Pesquisas
(CNP), as a natural research council, and created a nuclear research program under the
CNP. Shortly thereafter, Brazil‘s President Juscelino Kubitschek established The
67
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National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) in 1956. Brazil possessed an
abundance of uranium deposits and the most advanced industrial infrastructure in the
region at that time, making them a prime candidate for nuclear development. By 1959,
plans were in place to develop a nuclear reactor for electricity. However, despite the
initial rush to keep par with Argentina, Brazil’s nuclear efforts remained
underdeveloped until the early 1970s. The Brazilian government purchased a nuclear
reactor and its associated technology from the U.S. Company Westinghouse in 1972.
Construction of the 626-megawatt Angra I began soon after at Angra dos Reis. In
addition to the nuclear reactors, Brazil sought a complete nuclear fuel cycle that
included uranium enrichment and plutonium recovery technology; however, Brazil
was not a signatory to the NPT, therefore the U.S. government prohibited any U.S.
firm from selling nuclear technology to Brazil.69 When the Westinghouse deal fell
through, Brazil solicited the West German company Kraftwerk Union/Siemens for the
same capability.70 Brazil‘s 1975 US$10 billion agreement with West Germany
represented the first sale of a full nuclear fuel cycle and one of the largest transfers of
nuclear technology to a previously non-nuclear nation.71 The deal provided the
infrastructure Brazil required to succeed with their nuclear aspirations, providing four
nuclear 1350 megawatt pressurized water reactors, uranium processing, conversion,
enrichment, and reprocessing facilities, a uranium prospecting venture; a fuel elements
production plant, a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant, an engineering firm to handle key
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construction elements, and a plant to manufacture primary components.72
Analogous to Argentina, the three primary drivers of Brazil’s nuclear
ambitions were attaining technological self-sufficiency and energy independence,
prestige, and the progress of Argentina‘s nuclear program. The instability in the
energy market driven by the oil crisis of 1973 fostered the desire for energy
independence, as by 1974 80 per cent of Brazilian energy consumption relied on
expensive foreign oil.73 Brazil invested heavily in hydroelectric power, but soon
discovered that the energy production capacity would not meet the demand required.74
The Brazilian government believed that acquiring a nuclear program would grant the
country international prestige and would boost the country‘s standing within the
international community, having achieved a crowning technological feat. A Brazilian
diplomat noted that Brazil “gained new technological and political status on the world
scene with the nuclear agreement.”75 Furthermore, the Brazilian government was
concerned with lagging Argentina’s nuclear progress. The West German deal signified
an ambition and intent to surpass Argentina’s nuclear efforts. Additional, the Brazilian
government believed that Argentina intended to develop nuclear weapons and were
convinced that Brazil should follow suit. The Brazilian perception was that Argentina
felt threatened by Brazil’s size, wealth, and modernization, and would use nuclear
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weapons to imbalance the power relationship between the two countries.76 These
factors, coupled with overwhelming regional influence of these two nations, explains
why their nuclear ambitions and eventual non-weaponization policies matter to the
international community. Their nuclear rivalry was not an isolated episode, but rather
the natural evolution of their historical competition for almost two centuries. An
examination of how Argentina and Brazils nuclear weaponization policies follows.

Nuclear Weaponization Efforts
The international community widely held that Argentina and Brazil were
pursuing nuclear weapons programs, which further fostered the paranoia of both
countries leadership. The countries were regional rivals under predominantly military
rule and had consistently competed for regional supremacy, despite the fact that the
last time they had engaged in a bilateral armed conflict was 1825–28.77 Prior to the
rapid nuclear advancements in the 1970s, both nations had initiated domestic nuclear
efforts that were not subject to international safeguards. Furthermore, both nations
rejected the NPT, full-scope IAEA safeguards, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG),
and the Tlatelolco Treaty, refusing to buy in to the evolving international nuclear nonproliferation regime. Argentina and Brazil constantly maintained a right to conduct
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peaceful nuclear explosions, refused to submit their sensitive facilities to IAEA
safeguards, and continually opposed the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the NPT, believing
such agreements violated their national rights and national. All of these factors taken
together reinforced the notion that each country was intent on acquiring a nuclear
weapon.78
Despite the general consensus that Argentina and Brazil were pursuing nuclear
weapons, both the Argentine and Brazilian governments publicly denied any intention
to develop a nuclear weapons program. In 1975, General Juan E. Guglialmelli, former
director of the Argentine Institute of Strategic Studies and International Relations,
wrote, “Recently both a former foreign minister and the President of the CNEA have
declared that our country has no intention of building nuclear explosives.”79 Five years
later, Vice-Admiral Carlos Castro Madero, former President of CNEA, said,
“Argentina is not even thinking of developing a nuclear explosive…nor does it have
any intention of developing its nuclear technology for military purposes”.80 After
announcing that Argentina was capable of producing enriched uranium in 1983, the
Vice-Admiral also claimed that Argentina would use capability only for “peaceful
ends.”81 Former Argentine Ambassador to Brazil, Oscar Camilion, stated he never
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heard any meaningful Argentine official say that the country needed nuclear weapons
and told the Brazilian press that he had “no doubt of the peaceful intentions of the
Brazilian program.”82
Conversely, ministers from the Brazilian military expressed their intent to
develop nuclear weapons primarily as a symbol for attaining a great-power status. In
September 1986, former navy minister Admiral Maximiano Fonseca stated “If it was
up to me to decide, I would make an atomic bomb and detonate it in front of
international observers to demonstrate the extent of national technical know-how.”83
Brazil’s Secretary of State for Science and Technology Jose Goldemberg publicly
stated that he was “convinced that the army would build nuclear explosives and would
intend them to be nuclear weapons.”84 Indeed, Brazil’s military did have a covert
parallel nuclear program running alongside the official program.85 However, the true
nature of this covert effort remains unclear. Some scholars argue that the program was
an attempt to develop nuclear weapons,86 while others insist the motives were less
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nefarious.87 Brazilian diplomat Paulo S. Wrobel started,
It was argued that if the armed forces were so deeply involved in
nuclear research and development that certainly meant they were not
interested solely in peaceful purposes. Despite its apparent logic, this
argument is seriously flawed because it fails to consider the role played
by the three branches of the armed forces in the development of science
and technology in Brazil, at both research and production level. For
historical reasons, the Brazilian military had long been deeply involved
in the development of many areas of modern science and technology,
including branches of engineering, telecommunications, nuclear,
computing and aeronautics. Attributing a weaponry intention to the
parallel nuclear program simply because it was directed by navy
officers revealed a lack of understanding of the historical role of the
military in Brazil‘s technical and scientific development.88

Regional Rivalry and Prestige
As the preeminent industrial, economic, and military powers in Latin America,
Argentina and Brazil have long held a rivalrous relationship. Argentina and Brazil‘s
competition on the nuclear front can be viewed as a modern manifestation of that
contest. Historically, the rivalry appeared along political and economic fault lines.89
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Politically, tensions between both countries were cloaked in Peron’s vision of unity
among Latin America‘s Spanish-speaking populations and in Argentina‘s pursuit of
regional leadership,90 or a continuation of Spanish-Portuguese competition for the
domination of Latin America during the colonial period.91 Economically, Argentina
and Brazil competed for regional raw materials, energy, and markets. 92 While not
overtly military, the potential of military miscalculations grew in the 1960s and 1970s
as both countries embraced zero-sum realist doctrines.93 Some scholars caution that
because the relationship was more of a rivalry than acrimonious, neither side ever
intended an actual nuclear conflict.94 However, many scholars have also argued could
argue that nuclear doctrine between any nations would deem nuclear conflict
undesirable, independent of any preexisting relationships. Whoever mastered the
nuclear fuel cycle first would win; nevertheless, uncertainty remained as to the
ultimate intentions for the new technology.
Early in their development, the nuclear programs in both Argentina and Brazil
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encountered many technical and financial obstacles. The Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG), established after India‘s nuclear test in 1974, sought to ensure that nuclear
transfers for peaceful purposes would not be diverted to nuclear weapons efforts.
Argentina and Brazil viewed the NSG as an effort to establish the nuclear-weapon
haves, and the nuclear-weapon have-nots, creating a nuclear monopoly and
constraining technological development.95

Treaties, Norms, and Lies
Since the advent and first use of nuclear weapons technology during WWII,
global norm regarding the need for nuclear arms control, reduction, and disarmament,
has emerged. The following examines some of the core pillars of this global nonproliferation regime, and its role in shaping the proliferation options and decisions of
Argentina and Brazil.

Treaty of Tlatelolco
What would eventually become the Treaty of Tlatelolco, originally proposed to
the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) by Brazil in the early 1960s, sought to
create a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) throughout Latin America. However, the
Treaty was fraught with complications from its start. The initial Brazilian proposal
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was delivered a month before the Cuba crisis. In 1963, the UNGA voted
overwhelmingly in support of the Latin America NWFZ resolution; however,
Argentina and Cuba remained skeptical. Furthermore, following the Brazilian military
coup in April 1964, even Brazilian support of their own effort fell away and both
Brazil and Argentina began to intentionally delay negotiations. Nevertheless, a
Preparatory Commission was established by the UNGA which drafted the Treaty of
Tlatelolco; the treaty opened for signature by early 1967. The Treaty of Tlatelolco was
the first legally normative base non-proliferation in Latin America and was the first
NWFZ treaty in the world. The initial effort was difficult because there was no
template from which to base the work. The treaty formally prohibits production,
testing, and possession of nuclear weapons within the Latin American and Caribbean
zone and contained detailed stipulations against possession of nuclear weapons, unlike
the NPT, which seeks merely to limit the spread of nuclear weapons.
Argentina and Brazil both took exception to the treaty’s prohibition on
peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs). PNEs were widely held to be an indicator intent
to build nuclear weapons.96 Some scholars have argued the only difference between a
PNE and a nuclear weapon is their employment.97 Most parties interpreted the treaty
to prohibit PNEs, but as the only real nuclear powers in the region, Argentina and
Brazil insisted on preserving their right to produce nuclear explosive devises for
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peaceful technological purposes.98 Some leaders in Argentina and Brazil did not want
to preempt their legal ability to produce nuclear explosive devices defensive purposes,
should a national security need arise.99 Nevertheless, Argentina and Brazil eventually
capitulated to the demand in the early 1990s and jointly endorsed a ban on all nuclear
testing.100

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), or
“Disarmament of the Disarmed”
“The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty is one of the most important
multilateral accords in history. Though not perfect, it is the cornerstone of the world's
nuclear non-proliferation regime.”101 BAN Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the United
Nations
The NPT seeks to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons
technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to
further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete
disarmament. The Treaty entered into force in 1970 for an initial duration of 25 years
and is reviewed every five years; however, at the NPT Review and Extension
Conference in 1995, parties adopted the indefinite extension of the Treaty. The NPT
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stipulates nuclear-weapon countries are not to transfer nuclear weapons or nuclear
explosive device to any non-nuclear weapon countries. Furthermore, nuclear countries
are not to assists non-nuclear countries in the manufacture or acquisition of such
weapons or devices. Non-nuclear weapon signatories to the NPT agree not to receive
the transfer of a nuclear weapon or nuclear explosive device, not to manufacture or
acquire such weapons or devices, and not to seek or receive assistance developing any
such weapons or devices. Non-nuclear weapon countries agree to IAEA safeguards on
all fissionable material.
As emerging nuclear powers in the 1970s, Argentine and Brazilian leadership
developed opposition stances to what they viewed as unjust infringements upon their
sovereign rights. In a speech to the UN General Assembly in 1978, Argentine Foreign
Minister Rear Admiral Oscar Montes stated:
From the beginning, we rejected the NPT because of its discriminatory
character, since, for the first time in history, it legitimized a division of
the world into two categories: countries which can do anything as
regards nuclear affairs and countries which have their rights
curtailed.102
The NPT divided the world into two classes: the five recognized nuclear
weapons states (NWS) and the non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS). NWS had the
right to possess and produce nuclear weapons without over guidance and to do so in
large enough quantities to destroy the Earth. NNWS were prevented from obtaining
nuclear weapons and any domestic peaceful nuclear activities were subject to
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international scrutiny. Many government officials in both Argentina and Brazil
believed NWS, or developed states were intentionally attempting to control and deny
less developed countries the means for economic improvement.103
Whereas non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a matter of universal
concern, measures of disarmament must be consistent with the
inalienable rights of all states to develop, acquire and use nuclear
technology according to their priorities, interests and needs, including
explosions for peaceful purposes.104
In 1968, Argentine ambassador to the United Nations, Jose Maria Ruda
remarked
We realize that it is not easy to find final formulas in the treaty for
problems that have been under discussion for three years; at the same
time, however, the major nuclear powers should understand that the
sacrifice to be made by the non-nuclear weapon countries under the
system of the treaty is extremely high, without their receiving sufficient
assurances that would hold out the prospects of a more promising
future for the maintenance of international peace and security. Despite
this advance in the field of horizontal non-proliferation, there is no
indication at this time that would allow us to assume there will be a
reduction in the arms race among those who possess the most weapons.
Paradoxically, this treaty is for the disarmament of the disarmed.105
Brazil developed a similarly irritated position towards the NPT. Brazilian
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diplomat J.A. de Araujo Castro, in a speech at the Brazilian National War College:
Brazil has sought to characterize what is now clearly looming as a firm and
undisguised trend towards the freezing of world power…the main instrument of this
policy of freezing of World Power…The Treaty (NPT) established distinctive
categories of nations: one comprising weak and therefore non-adult and nonresponsible countries. Contrary to all historical evidence, the Treaty starts from the
premise that prudence and moderation are built-in features of power. It
institutionalizes inequality between nations and apparently accepts the premises that
the strong countries will become even stronger and the weak will grow even
weaker.106
In a 1977, Brazilian President General Ernesto Geisel stated,
The NPT seeks to legitimize a distribution of power which is
unacceptable, because it results from the stage at which States found
themselves at the date of its signature, as regards the application of
nuclear weapons technology. As a result of this stratification, the
Treaty requires strict control by the IAEA over the dissemination of the
peaceful uses of the atom while, in relation to the nuclear weapon
countries, no barrier is erected to the vertical proliferation of nuclear
armaments, as evidenced by the growth and sophistication of their
nuclear weaponry. Additionally, as far as security is concerned, the
NPT does not provide for any efficient system of protection for nonnuclear weapon countries…The true sense of non-proliferation is to ban
the diffusion of nuclear weapons, not the dissemination of nuclear
technology for the benefit of Man. Given adequate controls, the access
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to the technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should not be
subjected to discriminatory restrictions, whether between nuclear
weapon and non-nuclear weapon countries or among non-nuclear
weapon countries themselves.107

Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
(ABACC)
As the polity of each country began to shift toward democratically elected
civilian leadership throughout the 1980s, many officials in both countries believed
bilateral relations and the confidence building measures would be the key to
overcoming the fear inherent in the game theoretic world of nuclearization. Mutual
inspections could lay framework for establishing respect and dialogue and would
eventually brake down suspicions regarding the intentions of secretive nuclear
programs. As a result, leaders from both states drafted and implemented The
Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
(ABACC) to establish an understanding on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The
Agreement was signed at Guadalajara, Mexico on July of 1991. The ABACC is
responsible for the administration and application of the Common System of
Accounting and Control (SCCC), which is a full-scope safeguards system applied to
all nuclear activities covering all nuclear materials in both countries. Brazil and
Argentina established SCCC to verify that nuclear materials in both countries were not
used for purposes prohibited by the agreement. The role of ABACC to carry out
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inspections, designate inspectors, evaluate inspections,

Democratic Transitions
One of the most significant shifts within the domestic landscapes of both
Brazil and Argentina during the critical period of nuclearization between the 1970s1980s was the democratic transitions of Argentina and Brazil. The transitions of these
countries have influenced the stability of several Latin American democracies and will
likely continue to affect the future expansion of democracy and the stability and
security of the entire region. Therefore, the state, and stability of these polities
deserves attention, especially as democratic interest groups emerge during the period
of consolidation with varying views on nuclearization. If democracy is understood as a
system of government under which the people hold the power, there must be
“necessary and sufficient conditions in the real world for the existence of such a
condition.”108
Robert Dahl offers a thorough definition by outlining eight guarantees required
for the successful operation of democracy: 1) every member has the right to vote; 2)
each individual vote carries equal weight; 3) whoever receives the greatest number of
votes wins; 4) members may vote for whomever they desire; 5) members have
adequate and equal information pertaining to those who are running; 6) leaders or
policies with the greatest number of votes displace those with fewer votes; 7) the
orders of the elected officials are executed; and finally 8) decisions made during the
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inter-election period are either made from the direct expression of the election, or
made under the preceding seven conditions.109 While both Brazil and Argentina meet
this criteria, many scholars have argued that each state still falls short of a
consolidated democracy. A more qualitative definition would require that democracy
not only meet the minimalist standards of free and fair elections,110 but also sustain
competition111 and concessions,112 ensure that the will of the majority is tempered by
the rights of the minority,113 and hold horizontal and vertical accountability be
constitutionally institutionalized.114 It is with this qualitative definition that this
literature review will examine the degree to which the Installation of these two polities
reflects the values of democracy, and the concerns associated with the Consolidation
of each regime.
Democracy, in any state, begins with the installation of a democratically
elected government. Daniel Philpott traces the roots of Brazil and Argentina’s
democratic transitions to the Catholic Church’s evolutionary doctrinal embrace of
social justice for the poor.115 While the Catholic Church undoubtedly played a role in
the evolution of democratic values in Latin America, successful initiation of
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democratic transition in Brazil and Argentina was primarily limited by the influence of
the military. Similarly, the military advocated the development of a nuclear weapon,
while the Church advocated a sanctity of life that would forbid the use of weapons of
mass destruction.
Waisman argues the declining standard of living, human rights violations of
the military, and the defeat of the Argentine military in the Malvinas-Falklands War
led to an outcry for the end of the military regime in Argentina.116 The violence and
poorly executed foreign campaigning of the preceding military regime caused it to
have decreased currency as a political ally, thereby eroding support for military pet
projects like nuclear weaponization117 For Argentina, this helped to limit posttransitional power of the military and dampen the drive for the bomb. Dahl has argued
that military and police organizations being subject to civilian control are a necessary
condition of democracy. 118
In 1983, the new democratically elected president placed Argentina’s nuclear
program under civilian control and initiated several confidence building measures and
nuclear cooperation efforts with Brazil, signing five nuclear cooperation agreements.
In July 1987, President Alfonsin invited President Sarney to tour Argentina’s
unsafeguarded Pilcaniyeu pilot uranium enrichment facility. In response, Sarney
invited Alfonsin to tour the Brazilian Navy’s Aramar uranium enrichment facility near
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Sao Paulo. The significance of the visits was that each facility had served as a secret
nuclear installation.
Linz, Stepan, and Aguero argue that because an attempted coup in 1990,
unsupported by senior level commissioned officers, was thwarted by the president, the
democratic regime further legitimized civilian control and helped to galvanize many in
favor of democracy.119 Such a coop, if successful, would have likely threatened the
fragile binational non-proliferation agreements. Levitsky and Murillo have argued that
the Argentine financial crisis of 2001-2002 was significant test for the military. Even
in an atmosphere of chaos, the military accepted its exclusion from regime change.120
Aguero examines the role of civilian and military relations which resulted from the
amnesty provisions for human rights violations performed by the military regime. He
finds that tensions were eventually calmed when the amnesty provisions were vetoed
and the officers were tried.121 Waisman also suggests that the economic stagnation of
the 1980’s in Argentina also led to the “formation of a democratic political culture, the
commitment to democracy of economic and political elites, and strong political
leadership.”122
Brazil’s transition away from authoritarian military rule was somewhat softer
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than Argentina’s. Stepan explores the defense of authoritarian military power
employed by many Third World armies: arms importation networks must be
maintained and only the military would have an interest in protecting this interest;
therefore, the military must maintain the preeminent power. He argues that Brazil’s
developed arms infrastructure would actually increase the odds of democratic success
in that as the military is more self-sufficient, the military’s capacity to advance a bid
for power based on this reasoning is diminished.(84)123 Peeler argues that the
Brazilian Military gradually embraced the democratic transition as democratic
discourse began to evolve.124 As there was not as much ill-will between the military
and civilian spheres as had been present in Argentina, Aguero argues Brazil has in turn
had a harder time limiting the post-transitional influence of the military.125 As both
Brazil and Argentina transitioned to democracy from military authoritarianism, fully
establishing this civilian control has been a major obstacle to consolidation.
A complete democratic revolution consists of not only the installation of a
democratically elected government, but also the consolidation of the democratic
regime. O’Donnell argues that Brazil and Argentina should be classified as
“delegative democracies” which are “neither consolidated nor institutionalized.”126
The following section will review the literature surrounding these consolidation

123

Alfred Stepan, rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1988.
124
John Peeler, Building Democracy in Latin America Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009,
pp. 49-100.
125
Felipe Aguero, “Toward Civilian Supremacy in South America” Consolidating the Third
Wave Democracies. Ed. Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao
Tien. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997, pp. 177-206.
126
Guillermo O’Donnell, “Delegative Democracy” Working Paper 173, Kellogg Institute,
Notre Dame University, March 1992.

47

challenges.
Diamond suggests that in order to consolidate the democratic regime: the
military or other significant actors must be adequately insulated from the political
process, officeholders must be held horizontally accountable, and that individual and
group liberties be protected, whether in the majority or the minority.127 Linz and
Stepan argue that legitimacy is the primary obstacle to Brazil’s democratic
consolidation because of constraints on Brazil’s first democratically elected
government imposed by the military hierarchy and extremely high rates of
socioeconomic inequity.128 Hakim, however, credits Brazils’ leftist leader Lula on his
ability to enact social reform while empowering democratic institutions.129 Levitsky
has also applauded the Argentine leadership on the significant advances toward
alleviating social inequities as well.130 However, Hakim does caution that Argentina’s
democracy still faces significant challenges to consolidation. After averting a bid for
President Menum to seek an unconstitutional third term, President De la Rua was
forced to resign amidst entrenched corruption, politicized courts, and a severe
economic crisis.131 Even given the current explosion of economic growth in Brazil, the
benefit to democratic consolidation has yet to be proven. The manner in which this
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newfound wealth is distributed will have a profound effect on the socio-economic
stratifications that currently exist within Brazilian culture. 132
Of Diamond’s conditions, 133 O’Donnell finds the lack of constitutionally
guaranteed horizontal accountability as the primary reason Brazil and Argentina have
failed to consolidate.134 Both states, throughout varying and competing democratic
leadership, have remained in recurring states of economic crisis. Even in during the
early stages of the Brazilian democratic transition, Lamounier argued the success or
failure of the transition would depend on the democratic leadership’s ability to relieve
the severe wealth disparities.135 As such, fiscal reformation has become a central
tenant of executive policy in both Brazil and Argentina.136 Brazil’s 1988 constitution
was structured to provide fiscal decentralization, in order to increase the autonomy of
the states, and a strong president, who was granted the right the issue executive
decrees with the force of law.137 Sousa warned that the use, or abuse, of executive
power in this manner would be detrimental to democratic consolidation in that such
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actions override the legislature and bring chaos to the judiciary; each of which
undermines the separation of powers.138 While President Cardoso’s goals were “aimed
at consolidating the mechanisms of representation, strengthening political parties, and
eliminating distortions,”139 he was in reality weakening horizontal accountability
through legislating by decree.140 Additionally, the Brazilian government made it clear
in the 1988 constitution that Brazil would not pursue nuclear weapons, adding a
constitutional requirement for nuclear development to be “exclusively for peaceful
purposes”141 and that “all nuclear activity in Brazil would only be allowed for peaceful
purposes and upon Congressional approval.”142
Levitsky suggests that while actors are also playing by the democratic rules,143
the lack of horizontal accountability causes both systems to be highly volatile. 144
O’Donnell argues that these delegative democracies will remain in a constant state of
economic crisis until the political leadership takes the responsibility to overcome the
institutionalization hurdle and promote the establishment of horizontal accountability.
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Levitsky argues that despite its delegative tendencies, the Argentine
democracy saw significant advances toward consolidation including the unquestioned
fairness of elections, broad and consistent protection of political and civil rights, and a
free media climate.146 Schamis has also suggested that Argentina’s many crises have
allowed congressional bargaining and accommodation, central tenants of democratic
consolidation.147 However, Hakim assesses Argentine democracy still faces significant
challenges to consolidation. 148 After averting a bid for President Menum to seek an
unconstitutional third term, President De la Rua was forced to resign amidst
entrenched corruption, politicized courts, and a severe economic crisis. While an
oppositional force may be capable of winning the presidency of Argentina, (22)149 the
lack of a significant opposition party to the Peronist in the legislature could cause the
governance offered by these oppositional leaders to fail,150 further maintaining the
delegative cycle. 151
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IV.
ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE
The goal of this research is the determine the influential significance of each of
the leading theoretical explanations of nuclear proliferation in shaping the resulting
non-proliferation of Brazil and Argentina. The following section provides analysis of
the evidence presented in the preceding chapter, through the lenses of security, norms,
and domestic politics to provide insight into how each evolved over the course of the
states’ proliferation episode. Each piece of evidence is evaluated for its presence or
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absence in in the dyad of Argentina and Brazil.

Theoretical Explanations of Argentine and Brazilian Nuclear Rapprochement
Security
Norms
Domestic Politics
International security
Adherence/acceptance
Economic cost/benefit
environment
of NNPT
Under nuclear threat

Behavioral norms

Under rival threat

Nuclear non-use

Threat Environment shift

Respect for international
partners/law

Nuclear Umbrella

Fear of opposition/loss
of prestige
Table 2. Research Design

Political cost/benefit
Democratic
consolidation
Domestic organizations
(Nuclear Energy,
Military, Trade)
Domestic players
(Politicians, Public)

Security
The security approach is a valid and often occurring approach to the
nonproliferation puzzle, however it is not active in the Argentina and Brazil
proliferation dyad because the level of animosity between the two rivals doesn’t not
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meet the threshold at which either felt truly threatened by the other. Nevertheless, the
tension that remains between Great Britain and Argentina over the disputed territory
of the Falkland Islands could still be a fault line of future proliferation.

International security environment – No
The outbreak of the Falklands War is an intriguing piece of evidence on multiple
levels, the first of which is its impact on the nuclear decision calculus of Argentina. In
the Falklands War, Argentina found itself in a complex international security
environment, in direct armed conflict with a nuclear armed rival, without the security
of a nuclear armed ally. The Falklands War was the only real shift in the international
security environment that either country faced during this time period, but the conflict
was short lived and didn’t spur the proliferation spiral feared by some scholars.

Under nuclear threat – No
Argentina was no doubt aware and concerned about the international security
environment as evidenced by it voluntarily initiating the war in the first place. The
threat of Great Britain’s nuclear weapons should have been enough to deter Argentina
from ever attempting such an invasion, or at the least should have pushed Argentina
toward a nuclear weapon of its own to counter the British threat, however, nether
outcome prevailed. While it is likely that some in the military would have considered
developing a nuclear weapon to counter the British during this time, the limited scope
of the war would not have allowed a necessary timeline for weapons development.
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Under rival threat – No
The ambiguous and rivalrous threat of either Argentina or Brazil developing
nuclear weapons also did not have the predictive power to result in a proliferation
outcome either. The view held by some scholars that relations between Argentina and
Brazil were conflict riddled and overly competitive is not necessarily historically
accurate. Competition was, has been, and remains present ion the southern cone;
however, a pattern of cooperation between the two states far predates the nuclear issues of the 70s and 80s. Attempts at cooperation we evident as early as1908 when
Brazilian Foreign Minister Jose da Silva Paranhos negotiated territorial disputes
peacefully and formally with Argentina’s leadership. By 1914, the ABC Pact
(Argentina, Brazil and Chile) began to emerge and was formalized on May 15, 1915.
The ABC Pact (formally the Consultation, Non-Aggression and Arbitration Pact.) was
designed to develop cooperation, nonaggression, provide for the arbitration of
disputes, and also gave the three major South American countries a unified means of
resisting the United States' influence in the region. By 1941, bilateral negotiations
between Argentina and Brazil had yielded the Agreement for Progressive Free Trade,
which committed each not to apply trade barriers to activities not yet established in
either country. During these negotiations Argentina’s Economic Minister Federico
Pinedo observed:
I have always understood that it would be ideal to progress towards a
customs union - open, of course, to other neighboring countries...Let's
suppose that a policy in this direction would have been initiated many
years ago. Instead of having Brazil and Argentina run parallel
industries producing at high costs in different and all but closed
markets, we could have arrived at a profitable division of industrial
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work between the two nations...I am prepared to make great efforts in
order to reach as extensive as possible an understanding with Brazil.152

Threat Environment shift – No
With only minor territorial disputes with Great Britain and regional
relationships characterized by cooperation more often than combative, Brazil and
Argentina saw no real significant shifts in the threat environments during the period.
There were no other military conflicts that either country was engaged, or likely to
engage in during the period. The threat environment for both remained mostly static.

Nuclear Umbrella – No
During the period of analysis, and still today, both Argentina and Brazil remain
outside the covering of any nuclear security agreements and are not under any nuclear
umbrella agreement. The United States and some other nuclear powers provide
military support agreements to partner nations, ensuring strategic stability through
nuclear backing. The is no nuclear umbrella present in all of South America.

Norms
The evidence in the preceding chapter clearly demonstrates that the norms
approach was active in Argentina and Brazil’s proliferation episode through their
eventual acceptance and adherence to the core ideals and tenants of non-proliferation,

Gabriel Porcile. “The Challenge of Cooperation: Argentina and Brazil, 1939-1955” Journal of Latin
American Studies, 27:1 (Feb., 1995), pp. 129-159.
152
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but in a few rather unique ways.

Adherence/acceptance of NNPT – Yes, in principle
First, Argentina and Brazil have both shown a willingness to adhere to the core
ideal of the NPT as evidenced by their lack of nuclear weapons, however, each were
reluctant participants in the formal international regimes that had been established by
the US, British, and other western powers. It wasn’t until regional agreements between
Argentina and Brazil had been negotiated and came into force that each country was
willing to formally accept the larger non-proliferation regime. Nevertheless, both
adhered to the behavioral norms of non-development set out by the regime.

Behavioral norms – Yes
From the 1960s to the early 1990s, Argentina and Brazil both pursued ambitious
nuclear energy developments, but did so on occasion under a veil of secrecy by
refusing to join the NPT and the Treaty of Tlatelolco. This secrecy led to paranoia,
miscalculation, and the assumption that both were set on beating the other to the
bomb; however, this misconception was driven primarily by US projection and other
western observers but was not necessarily the perception within the dyad itself.

Nuclear non-use – Yes
Argentina has pursued a nuclear-powered submarine effort with varying
degrees of zeal over the past few decades but has not shown a desire to actually outfit
the nuclear-powered vessels with nuclear laden missiles. Due to its natural resources
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and technical expertise, Brazil has at its disposal the complete nuclear fuel cycle, from
mineral prospecting to uranium enrichment and fuel fabrication; however, Brazil has
never developed the bomb, and has shown no intention to enrich uranium to a
weapons grade level, beyond 20%.
Further revisiting the Falklands War in light of the nuclear taboo again proves
revealing. Argentina’s military by 1982 was willing to carry out an invasion of
territory occupied by a nuclear capable Great Britain. Although Argentina did not
directly attack Great Britain proper, the British nuclear capability was a factor that the
Argentina’s military leadership weighted before launching their invasion. Similarly,
the British were willing to bring nuclear weapons into the theater, albeit never actually
willing to employ its capability. Argentina’s military leadership believed that the
British would not respond militarily, with either conventional or nuclear weapons.
When the British did actually begin conventional attacks, Argentina’s military
leadership remained convinced that the Great Britain’s nuclear capability would not be
employed. I asses that this lesson from the British in the non-use of nuclear weapons
likely served to reinforce the notion that nuclear weapons were not worth the military
investment for Argentina, as they are rendered useless by the emergence of the nuclear
taboo.

Respect for international partners/law – Yes
Both Argentina and Brazil have demonstrated a respect for international
partners and law but are primarily focused on their immediate regional partnerships
and have shown to be particularly sensitive to what they interpret as punitive power
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plays from external international regimes. While shunning the NPT and other
international non-proliferation efforts in what Argentine ambassador to the United
Nations, Jose Maria Ruda referred to as the Treaty for the Disarmament of the
disarmed, Argentina and Brazil sought to establish a Latin American Nuclear Free
Zone on their own terms, while maintaining their own rights to nuclear energy
capabilities. The establishment of the bilateral inspection agency ABACC laid the
groundwork for confidence building between the two rivals, and it also gave both a
stake in the leadership and success of the overall effort.
Following the success of the ABACC, both Argentina and Brazil have
eventually signed and ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco, Comprehensive Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT), and become members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG);
however, in its 2008 National Defense Strategy (NDS), Brazil will not sign any
additions to the NPT, including the Additional Protocol(IAEA), until the nuclear
weapon states have made progress towards nuclear disarmament.

Fear of opposition/loss of prestige – Yes
Argentina and Brazil demonstrated that they were sensitive to opposition on
the weaponization front and desired to maintain their prestige as the leading countries
of Latin America, however, their desire for prestige seems to have surpassed just
merely the acquisition of nuclear weapons, taking a more strategic leadership and
ownership of their collective region. Argentine and Brazilian leaders rejected the
notion of external powers setting the rules of the game for South American, instead
seeking a level of prestige that would allow them to carve our one of the few nuclear
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weapons free continents in the world. By fully embracing the norm of nuclear
abstinence, Brazil and Argentina were able to avoid the nuclear arms race that
bankrupted the Soviet Union and the elusive notion of disarmament with which
nuclear weapons states continue to struggle.

Domestic Politics
The evidence in the preceding chapter also supports at least a corollary tie to
the domestic politics model in shaping the non-proliferation of Argentina and Brazil.
Both countries weighted and considered nuclear weapons programs for decades, but it
wasn’t until their respective democracies emerged and began to consolidate that any
visible commitments to non-proliferation began to emerge. The push for liberalized
regional trade, which had been present since the early twentieth century, was a greater
motivator for the players and organizations in both counties. Additionally, the
perceived power plays of the nuclear haves versus the South American nuclear have
nots shaped the collective mindsets of players and organizations in both countries. A
unity between Argentina and Brazil’s leadership, a unity present since the ABC Pact,
was solidified in both countries resistance to the perception of being bullied.

Economic cost/benefit – Yes
Nuclear economics played a rather complex role in shaping this specific
proliferation outcomes. While the direct economic impacts related explicitly to any
weapons programs seemed to have been of minimal concern to leaders in both
Argentina and Brazil, the desire to develop and possess nuclear power capability,
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independent of extra-regional oversight, was driven overwhelmingly by economic
concerns. Nevertheless, the multiple economic crises in both countries likely served to
limit the resources available for the military to fully support a costly nuclear weapons
development effort.

Political cost/benefit – No
Regional view on the political costs and benefits of nuclear weapons
development seemed to evolve somewhat homogeneously over time. Leaders early in
the nuclear age shared initial technological curiosities and sought nuclear power and
weapons capabilities Nuclear capability obviously appealed to leaders in both
Argentina and Brazil due to their symbol of great power status and a point of national
pride. Leaders early in the period were sure to display and tout the nuclear
advancements that were made by each country. However, the was little evidence that
leaders were concerned, campaigning, and felt pressure to cave to the nuclear demands
and certain constituencies.

Democratic consolidation – Yes
One of the most significant shifts within the domestic landscapes of both
Brazil and Argentina during the critical period of nuclearization between the 1970s1980s was the democratic transitions of Argentina and Brazil. In 1983, the new
democratically elected president placed Argentina’s nuclear program under civilian
control and initiated several confidence building measures and nuclear cooperation
efforts with Brazil, signing five nuclear cooperation agreements. While the military’s
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commitment to weaponization seems to have always been soft, the transitions to
civilian leadership in each state paved to way to formalize the end on any nuclear
weapons ambitions.

Domestic organizations (Nuclear Energy, Military, Trade) – Yes
Organizationally, by 1983, both the Brazilian Physics Society (SBF) and the
Argentine Physics Association (AFA) had issued a joint declaration, encouraging both
governments to exchange nuclear information and to establish mutual inspections of
nuclear related facilities and agreed to push their respective governments to that
end.153 For the first time, domestic organizations in both countries had begun to lobby
for nuclear openness and cooperation. The following year, the same organizations
issued another joint statement declaring opposition toward nuclear weapons
development, considering it “morally unacceptable the participation of physicists in
the development of nuclear weapons.”154

Domestic players (Politicians, Public) – Yes
The actions of several key domestic players and organizations also facilitated
the resulting non-proliferation. In 1980, the military governments Argentina and
Brazil came together for the Cooperative Agreement for the Development and
Application of the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. In 1983, the new democratically

153

Wrobel, Paulo S. and John R. Redick. 1998. ―Nuclear Cooperation in South America:
The Role of Scientists in the Argentine-Brazilian Rapprochement. Annals of the New York
Academy of Sciences, Vol. 866, No. 1: 165–181.
154
Fabbri, Claudia M. 2005. Social Constructivism and the Role of Ideas: The Construction of
Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Cooperation, 1979-1991. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Warwick.

61

elected president placed Argentina’s nuclear program under civilian control and
initiated several confidence building measures and nuclear cooperation efforts with
Brazil, signing five nuclear cooperation agreements. The Joint Working Group on
Nuclear Affairs (JWG) was created in 1985, eventually evolving into the Permanent
Committee on Nuclear Affairs (PCNA) by 1988. The 1987 nuclear facility visits by
Argentine President Alfonsin and Brazilian President Sarney was also a significant. In
addition to the actions of presidential leadership and nuclear physicists, liberalizing
domestic regimes began to emerge in both states; banks, export firms, and monetary
agencies for political and economic policies more favorable to trade than to inward
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focused nuclear fiefdoms.

Theoretical Explanations of Argentine and Brazilian Nuclear Rapprochement
Security
Norms
Domestic Politics
International
Adherence/acceptance
security
N
Y
Economic cost/benefit
Y
of NNPT
environment
Under
N
Behavioral norms
Y
Political cost/benefit
N
nuclear threat
Under
N
Nuclear non-use
Y Democratic consolidation
Y
rival threat
Threat
Environment
shift

N

Nuclear
Umbrella

N
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Respect for
international
partners/law

Y

Domestic organizations
(Nuclear Energy, Military,
Trade)

Y

Domestic players
(Politicians, Public)

Y

Fear of opposition/loss
Y
of prestige
5/5
Table 3. Summary Findings
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V.
CONCLUSION

By the 1970s and early 1980s, Brazil and Argentina had acquired and begun
developing nuclear technology; at the time, neither country was a willing participant
the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Both countries had devoted decades of
research and funding into developing their nuclear infrastructures, with a desire to
become energy independent. Both had achieved a uranium enrichment capability, but
neither had publicly admitted to a nuclear weapons development effort. Nevertheless,
the rivalrous relationship and push to advance their influence and power in the region
made this dyad ripe for miscalculation and a nuclear arms race. Both countries
viewed one another potential security threat, and their militaries had at least
considered developing contingency war plans. However, the above process tracing
reveals that despite the realist’s perilous prediction that a proliferation episode was
bound to occur, the resulting nuclear weapons never came into being. A causal
relationship between the security driver and the resulting nuclear weapons alone is
insufficient. Until the 1980’s, both countries were governed primarily by authoritarian
military regimes which kept the true nature of any nuclear activities in a veil of
uncertainty, Furthermore, until the 1980s there was little diplomatic interaction
between the two sides and little social and economic interdependence However, the
aforementioned process tracing also reveals common ground between the rivals,
specifically in their reject of the emerging Non-proliferation regime. Despite Brazil
initiating the effort, both rejected the limitations on PNEs required by the Treaty of
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Tlatelolco, both refused to join the NPT due to its discriminatory and imbalanced
policies.
On the domestic front, it becomes readily apparent that the same economic
decline that ushers in a wave of democratic transition in the region, also served to
limit the allocation of resources to nuclear development and weaponization activities.
As both countries civilian governments gained support, authority, and stability during
the 1980s, the military push for nuclear weapons lost its driving voice, both in the
power of the purse and with the general public. The consolidating civilian led
democracy was able to approach national security concerns from a perspective less
influences by the doctrines of military conflict. Hymans has also identified that Presidential leadership and identity conceptions during the critical nuclear decisionmaking periods of the 1980s and early 1990s, led not only to immediate nonweaponization, but also laid the cooperative framework from which future
weaponization episodes could have occurred.
There is no single factor, nor actor in this particular dyad that led to the
cessation of the weaponization spiral. Rather, this particular proliferation episode
seems better characterized by its exceptions and prudential timing of polity shifts.
The lack of prolonged armed conflict, or the lack of diametrically opposed world
views, which characterizes most historical arms races, provided a softer soil by which
cooler heads could blossom. Emerging norms and international regimes served to
limit access and availability of critical pieces of nuclear technology, but perhaps more
importantly in this episode, the punitive policies of the international regime actually
provided common ground by which Argentina and Brazil could open a shared
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dialogue; the roots of diplomacy, too, began to take hold. Despite general nuclear
competition throughout the 1960s and 1970s, both states developed a common
position and hostility towards the international non-proliferation regime. Finally, the
significant shift from authoritarian military leadership in both countries to
consolidating, civilian led democratic polities provided the appropriate stable
architecture by which the states were able retreat from the nuclear brink. It was in
this context in which the shared interests between Argentina and Brazil surfaced.

Trust, but Verify
Negotiations leading to the establishment of the ABACC provided perhaps the
most significant shift in diplomacy between Argentina and Brazil. The joint disdain
of the punitive posture of the international non-proliferation regime prompted the
negotiations and also provided a common point of self-sufficient prime that provided
the fuel for the 2 countries to overcome their security skepticism and etch out a
uniquely Latin approach to the proliferation issue. This common position allowed
both countries to eventually sign and enforce the Treaty of Tlatelolco, renounce their
rights to conduct PNEs, strengthened their nuclear export controls, created a joint
system of inspections of all their nuclear facilities that includes accepting full-scope
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, scaled back uranium
enrichment capabilities, and eventually even adherence as NNWS signatories to the
NPT.
Key to the success of nuclear de-escalation between Argentina and Brazil was
the high degree of bilateral cooperation between the nuclear policies of the two states.
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Rather than being paralyzed but uncertain security concerns, both countries seized an
opportunity to improve their security and economy through reducing nuclear
competition. The shift toward cooperation between the nuclear enterprises of each
country is still present today.

Outlook
Some scholars argue that the best theories are those that explain the largest
number of cases and that the majority of countries that have acquired nuclear
weapons appear to be best explained by the security model. However, as highlighted
in the preceding chapters the security model explanation for nuclear proliferation
decisions is an insufficient causal mechanism to explain the non-weaponization of
Argentina and Brazil; the problem of nuclear proliferation is driven by more than a
single universal driver. History provides examples of both successful acquisition of
nuclear weapons proliferation, abandonment of nuclear pursuits, and altogether
abstention in the nuclear realm altogether; all decisions being driven by different
multifaceted casual models. Cooperation was likely possible because Argentine and
Brazilian security concerns about on another were overwhelming, or fundamental to
the state’s policies. Therefore, future scholarship in the area of nuclear proliferation
would likely benefit from a focus on comparative studies seeking to uncover the
conditions under which specific causal forces produced similar outcomes.
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